

Verification of imperative BSP programs: application to cost and model-checking

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Do you trust you programs ? Is there a bug ?



Introduction

- A need to prove parallel programs :
 - cost of the crash of massively parallel computations
 - more and more parallel programs
- Additional difficulties :
 - Communication procedures
 - Synchronization mechanisms
 - Interleaving of instructions
- Use of Hoare semantics
 - Annotated programs (verification a posteriori deductive)
 - partial correctness
 - other properties
 - more automatic than Coq/Isabelle ?
 - less difficult than Coq/Isabelle ?
 - Generation of proof obligations

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BSPlib/PUB

Library for the BSP model:

- C Language
- Send/Receive routines
- DRMA routines

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PUB Communications

Two kinds of communications:

- Message Passing (BSMP)

- `void bsp_send(int dest, void* buffer, int size)`
- `t_bspmsg* bsp_findmsg(int proc_id, int index)`

- Remote Memory Access (DRMA)

- `void bsp_push_req(t_bsp* bsp, void* ident, int size)`
- `void bsp_get(t_bsp* bsp, int srcPID, void* src, int offset, void* dest, int nbytes)`

Synchronisation : `void bsp_sync(t_bsp* bsp)`

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The WHY Language

WHY: an intermediate language

- For program verification (deductive)
- Annotated programs (pre- post conditions)
- Several back-end provers (Coq, Alt-ergo, Simplify, Z3 ...)
 - need axiomatisation for set/list etc.
- "pre-processor" and "variant" for each prover
- need sometime 'ghost codes'
- Provers can generate certificates (Isabelle/Coq)

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
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The WHY tools



Language definition

- BSP-WHY is extended from WHY
- Additional instructions for parallel operations
- Additional notations in assertions about parallelism
- Automatic transformation to Why code (sequentialisation)

Language definition

$BSPWhy ::= Why$

| **sync** synchronisation

| **push**(x) Register x for global access

| **put**(e, x, y) Distant writing

| **send**(x, e) Message passing


now a 'Parameter' with a 'sync' side-effect can be used instead of a **sync** (MPI collective operations)

Logic extensions

- x is used to represent the value of x on the current processor
- $x \langle i \rangle$ is used to represent the value of x on the processor i
- $\langle x \rangle$ is used to represent the parallel variable x as an array
- $t = \langle\langle f(pid) \rangle\rangle$ is a syntactic sugar to $\forall i. \text{proc}(i) \rightarrow t[i] = f(i)$


Trying to prove its correctness

BSP-WHY, an extension of WHY for BSP algorithms:




General idea of the transformation $\text{BSP-WHY} \Rightarrow \text{WHY}$

Simulation of the parallel execution by a sequential execution




Decomposition into blocks (1/3)

We extract the biggest blocks of code without synchronization:



Decomposition into blocks (2/3)

Each block is transformed into a *for* loop:



Decomposition into blocks (3/3)

Need to check that the `sync` instruction match: no code such as

```
if pid=0 then sync
  else p
```

or even

```
if pid=0 then p1;sync
  else p2;sync
```


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Memory management

p processors \rightarrow 1 processor : need to simulate p memories in one.

- variable $x \rightarrow p$ -array x
- Special arrays to store communications

Transformation of variables

BSP-WHY term	WHY term
x	$x[i]$
$\langle x \rangle$	x
$x\langle j \rangle$	$x[j]$

Variable not transformed into arrays

Some special cases :

- A variable which lives only in a sequential block
- A variable used with remote access communications

Send communications

Communications are defined in a *WHY* prelude file:

- Messages are stored in lists
- The `bsp_send` function is defined as a parameter
- Send communications are done with a predicate
- The synchronisation calls each communication predicate

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Remote Memory Access: put/get operations (1/2)

- Memory model more complex
- A table of variables is stored
- An association table keeps records of *push* associations
- Queues for *push*, *pop*, *put* and *get* operations

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Remote Memory Access: put/get operations (2/2)

The association table is needed :

Proc 1 Proc 2

Push(x) Push(y)

Push(y) Push(x)

sync sync

<i>P1</i>	<i>P2</i>
<i>x</i>	<i>y</i>
<i>y</i>	<i>x</i>

Remote Memory Access: put/get operations (2/2)

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
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Subgroup synchronization



$$S = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4\}$$

$$S1 = \{0, 1\}$$


$$S2 = \{2, 3, 4\}$$

Subgroup synchronization : example in C/PUB

```
t_bsp subbsp;
int part[2];
part[0] = 2;
part[1] = bsp_nprocs(bsp);
bsp_partition (bsp, &subbsp, 2, part);
if(bsp_pid() $<$ 2) {
    ...
    bsp_sync(&subbsp);
    ...
} else {
    ...
}
bsp_done (&subbsp);
```

same kind of operation in MPI (even in collective operations)

Subgroup synchronization : transformation



Subgroup synchronization : safety

To avoid deadlocks, we check that all processors of a subgroup will synchronize at the same time :

$$\text{assert}(\forall i \in S, \text{sub}[i] \subset S)$$

```
bsp_sync ( sub , S )
```

Example: prefix calculation

- At the beginning, each processor i contains a value x_i
- At the end, each processor contains the prefix
 $x_0 * x_1 * \dots * x_i$
- Useful in many calculations (FFT, n-body, graph algorithms etc.)

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Now using BSP-WHY !

Cost

- **Worst-case analysis \Rightarrow adding counting variables (ticks) for some operations**
 - for each operation \Rightarrow adding one tick to the counter (side effect=monad in Coq)
 - bigger invariants
- $O(n) \Rightarrow$ more difficult
- more difficult than only counting the number of computations
- less papers on machine-checked proofs but many 'Worst-case static analysis' papers

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State-space construction (model-checking)

- initial state s_0
- successors given by $\text{succ}(s)$
- transition $s \rightarrow s'$ whenever $s' \in \text{succ}(s)$
- inductive (iteration) computation of the state space
 - as a graph
 - as a set of reachable states
- we here only present sets for simplicity

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Simple sequential algorithm in Python

```
1 def normal():
2     knoww={}
3     todo={s0}
4     while todo:
5         s=todo.pop()
6         known.add(s)
7         todo.update(succ(s)–known)
8     return known
```

Sequential dfs algorithm in Python

```
1 def dfs(s):
2     known.add(s)
3     for new_s in succ(s)–known:
4         if new_s not in known:
5             dfs(new_s)
6
7 def main_dfs ()
8     known={}
9     dfs(s0)
10    return known
```

Sequential breadth-first algorithm in Python

```
1 def breadth_first() =
2   known={}
3   current={s0}
4   next={}
5   while current:
6     for s in current:
7       known.add(s)
8       next.update(succ(s)–known–current)
9     current=next.copy();
10    next={}
11 return known
```

Now using WHY !

Naive BSP algorithm

- partition function cpu to place states onto processors
 - hash the state (modulo number of processors)
 - most used approach
- each processor i computes $succ(s)$ iff $cpu(s) = i$
- other states are sent to their owners
- stop when no processor has computed new states

BSP algorithm (main loop) using BSP-Python

```
1 def main_par_state_space ():
2     known={}
3     pastsend={}
4     total =1
5     if cpu(s0)=my_pid:
6         todo={s0}
7     else:
8         todo={}
9     while total>0:
10        tosend=local_successor(known,todo,pastsend)
11        exchange(total,todo,known,tosend,pastsend)
12    return known
```

local computations

```
1 def local_successors (known, todo, pastsend):
2   while todo:
3     s=todo.pop()
4     known.add(s)
5     for new_s in succ(s)–known–pastsend:
6       tgt=cpu(new_s)
7       if tgt==my_pid:
8         todo.add(new_s)
9       else:
10        tosend[tgt].add(new_s)
11  return tosend
```

Exchange of data and new todo/total/pastsend

```
1 def exchange (total, todo, known, tosend, pastsend) :  
2   total , received=BSP_EXCHANGE(tosend)  
3   todo=received-known  
4   for i in xrange(0,nprocs)  
5     pastsend.update(tosend[i])
```

local computations (only pre- and post-conditions)

```

1 local_successors: known: state set ref → todo:state set ref → pastsend: state set ref →
2 { (known ⊆ StSpace) and (todo ⊆ StSpace) and (pastsend ⊆ StSpace) and (known ∩
  todo)=∅
3   and (∀ s:state. s ∈(known ∪ todo) → cpu(s)=my_pid) and (∀ s:state. s ∈past_send →
  cpu(s)≠ my_pid)
4 }
5   state set farray writes known, todo
6 { (todo=∅) and (known ⊆ StSpace) and (∀ s:state. s ∈known → cpu(s)=my_pid)
7   and (∪(result) ⊆ StSpace) and ((result ∩ pastsend)=∅)
8   and (∀ i:int. isproc(i) → ∀s:state. s ∈result<i> → cpu(s)≠ my_pid)
9   and ((known@ ∪ todo@) ⊆ known)
10  and (∀ s:state. s ∈known → succ(s) ⊆ (known ∪ ∪(result) ∪ pastsend))
11  and (todo@=∅ → ∪(result)=∅)
12 }

```

Main BSP loop

```

1  while total>0 do
2  {
3  invariant  $\bigcup(\langle\text{known}\rangle) \cup \bigcup(\langle\text{todo}\rangle) \subseteq \mathbf{StSpace}$ 
4      and  $(\bigcup(\langle\text{known}\rangle) \cap \bigcup(\langle\text{todo}\rangle)) = \emptyset$ 
5      and GoodPar( $\langle\text{known}\rangle$ ) and GoodPart( $\langle\text{todo}\rangle$ )
6      and  $(\forall i,j:\text{int. isproc}(i) \rightarrow \text{isproc}(j) \rightarrow \text{total}\langle i \rangle = \text{total}\langle j \rangle)$ 
7      and  $\text{total}\langle 0 \rangle \geq |\bigcup(\langle\text{todo}\rangle)|$ 
8      and  $s0 \in (\bigcup(\langle\text{known}\rangle) \cup \bigcup(\langle\text{todo}\rangle))$ 
9      and  $(\forall e:\text{state. } e \in \bigcup(\langle\text{known}\rangle) \rightarrow \text{succ}(e) \subseteq (\bigcup(\langle\text{known}\rangle) \cup \bigcup(\langle\text{todo}\rangle)))$ 
10     and  $\bigcup(\langle\text{pastsend}\rangle) \subseteq \mathbf{StSpace}$ 
11     and  $(\forall i:\text{int. isproc}(i) \rightarrow \forall e:\text{state. } e \in \text{pastsend}\langle i \rangle \rightarrow \text{cpu}(e) \neq i)$ 
12     and  $\bigcup(\langle\text{pastsend}\rangle) \subseteq (\bigcup(\langle\text{known}\rangle) \cup \bigcup(\langle\text{todo}\rangle))$ 
13 variant pair(paccess(total,0), | S \  $\bigcup(\text{known})$  |) for lexico_order
14 }
15 let tosend=(local_successors known todo pastsend) in
16   exchange todo total !known !tosend
17 done;
18 !known
19 {StSpace= $\bigcup(\langle\text{result}\rangle)$  and GoodPart( $\langle\text{result}\rangle$ )}

```

Now using BSP-WHY !

Conclusion

- **BSP-WHY is an extension of the WHY language for BSP programs**
- BSP-WHY programs are transformed into WHY programs
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Merci !